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ABSTRAK 
Teori agensi mengindikasikan bahwa manajer proyek yang mempunyai informasi privat 
dan insentif untuk melak ukan shirking akan melakukan tindakan yang disfungsional berupa 
meneruskan proyek yang diketahui tidak menguntungkan. Isu ini harus diteliti secara luas 
dengan setting/skenario dan sampel yang berbeda. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk 
menguji perilaku shirking dari manajer proyek ketika mereka harus menghentikan proyek 
yang tidak menguntungkan.  Tujuan berikutnya adalah untuk menguji peran konpensasi 
untuk mencegah perilaku shirking.  
 Penelitian ini menggunakan metoda eksperimental dengan memanipulasi du a kondisi 
yaitu informasi privat dan insentif untuk melakukan shirking. Partisipan dalam eksperimen 
ini adalah 138 mahasiswa kelas eksekutif program Magister Manajemen Universitas 
Gadjah Mada. Hasil penelitian tidak mendukung perilaku yang diprediksi oleh Harrell dan 
Harrison (1994). Manajer yang mempunyai informasi privat dan insentif untuk shirking 
menghentikan proyek yang tidak menguntungkan (walaupun terdapat kecenderungan 
namun tidak signifikan secara statistis).  
 Bertentangan dengan harapan, penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa kompensasi 
(bonus dan pinalti) meningkatkan kecenderungan manajer untuk melanjutkan tindakan 
yang disfungsional ini.  Selanjutnya, penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa mahasiswa wanita, 
usia muda, kurang berpengalaman, mempunyai latar belakang pendidikan bisnis pada 
level strata satu, dan belum menikah mempunyai kecenderungan untuk melanjutkan proyek 
yang tidak menguntungkan. Hasil yang demikian mungkin disebabkan oleh faktor risiko 
yang mempengaruhi perilaku mereka.  
 Penelitian selanjutnya harus dilakukan untuk memeriksa ketidakkonsistenan dalam 
isu ini dengan mempertimbangkan beberapa kelemahan. Penggunaan sampel yang berupa 
manajer akan memberikan hasil yang lebih kuat daripada menggunakan proksi mahasiswa 
eksekutif magister manajemen. Penggunaan skenario lain (terutama skema konpensasi 
yang berbeda) untuk menguji isu ini juga diperlukan. Penelitian selanjutnya juga perlu 
mempertimbangkan faktor preferensi terhadap risiko dan locus of control. Seseorang yang 
mempunyai locus pegawasan internal akan cenderung untuk melanjutkan proyek yang 
tidak menguntungkan karena ia merasa mampu untuk mengubah keadaan. 
Kata kunci:  Masalah agensi, asimetri informasi, insentif untuk shirking, penghentian 
proyek yang tidak menguntungkan 
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INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with human 
behavior in decision-making. Rational 
decision-making assumes that managers 
maximize the profitability of the firm when 
they have to make decisions in their work. 
Managers will invest resources in the projects 
which provide profits to the firm and then 
periodically evaluate the performance of those 
projects. Projects that are predicted to be 
profitable should be continued but projects that 
are predicted to be unprofitable should be 
terminated to avoid further losses to the firm. 
However, previous evidence shows a 
contradiction of human behavior in their 
rational decision-making. These studies 
document that managers often continue 
projects which are predicted to be 
unprofitable . This behavior is not in the best 
interest of the firm. From a psychological point 
of view, the need for internal justification is 
one explanation of this irrational decision-
making. Most of the earlier studies utilize this 
psychological argument. 
Some of the recent studies establish a new 
ground for this irrational behavior. Agency 
theory is used to explain why the managers as 
an agent continue an unprofitable project. 
Those studies confirm that the irrational 
behavior may be rational from the agency 
theory if several conditions exist.  
The purposes of this study are: (1) to 
examine whether the interaction of incentives 
to shirk and privately held information causes 
the manager to make the decision to continue 
unprofitable projects and (2) to confirm that 
appropriate compensation will reduce the 
degree of escalation. The difference between 
this study and Harrell and Harrison’s study 
(1994) are: (1) this study incorporates 
uncertainty factor in the decision choice setting 
while Harrell and Harrison (1994) use 
deterministic numbers, (2) this study uses a 
                                                 
1
 See Staw (1981) and Leatherwood and Conlon (1987; 
1988). 
different manipulation setting for incentives to 
shirk, and (3) this study examines whether 
incentives provided through compensation 
alter the termination decision.  
Prior Literature 
Staw (1981) shows that the tendency to 
escalate commitment to the projects as a result 
of an attempt at self-justification, internal or 
external justification, or preservation of an 
image of consistency. The need to rationalize a 
decision replaces an economic explanation. 
Feeling responsible for the setback is one 
cause of the escalation. 
Leatherwood and Conlon (1987) discloses 
that the behavioral manifestations of 
commitment to a course of action following a 
setback depend not only on the extent to which 
a decision maker feels responsible for the 
setback, but also on the extent to which 
another party can be held responsible for it.  
However, Leatherwood and Conlon (1988) 
confirmed that escalation as a result of 
responsibility is more likely to be observed in 
unstructured decisions, such as allocations of 
R&D, product development decisions, or 
unusual capital acquisition. Based on their 
results, they suggest that the effects of 
behavioral commitment on resource decisions 
may be limited to situations of limited 
information.  
Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut (1989) 
present an alternative explanation for the 
irrational behavior based on economic 
rationality. They demonstrate that escalation 
behavior can be explained as part of a larger 
phenomenon of hiding private information on 
human capital. The main ingredients of their 
explanation come from: (1) information on the 
desirability of switching is private to the 
decision maker; (2) this information is also 
related to the unobservable talents of the 
decision makers; (3) these talents are inferred 
by others in society from the observation of the 
decision maker’s actions; and (4) these 
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inferences impact the future opportunities of 
the decision maker. 
Harrison and Harrell (1993, 1994) use 
elements of agency theory
2
 in experimental 
decision making simulation. The two elements 
used are privately held information and 
incentives to shirk. Agency theory predicts 
how availability of information and incentives 
influence managers’ decisions. In the 
principal-agent relationship model, agents will 
act in their own self-interest which creates a 
conflict between agents and principals. Both of 
their studies provide experimental evidence 
that when both incentives to shirk and 
privately held information exist, managers are 
more likely to continue projects which 
logically should be discontinued. 
Hypotheses Development 
An agency relationship exists when 
principals hire agents in order to delegate 
responsibilities to them. In agency models, 
individuals are assumed to be motivated solely 
by self-interest. An agency problem arises 
when cooperative behavior, which maximizes 
the group’s welfare, is not consistent with each 
individual agent’s self interest [Baiman, 
(1990)]. This theory may explain why 
managers often make decisions to continue 
unprofitable projects. 
One of the major assumptions in agency 
theory is the information asymmetry 
assumption [Baiman (1990)]. The agent is 
assumed to have private information which is 
costly for the principal to obtain. 
Consequently, the greater the information 
asymmetry, the more likely the agent makes 
decisions not in the best interest of the 
principal because it is unlikely the principal 
                                                 
2
 Baiman (1982, 1990) and Eisenhardt (1989) provide 
intensive analyses about agency theory that are used as 
foundations in Harrell and Harrison’s studies (1993, 
1994) and in this study. 
can detect the shirking
3 without substantial 
efforts and expenses.  
In short-term agency relationships, the 
information asymmetry between principal and 
agent is likely to be greater [Eisendardt 
(1989)]. Thus, this condition provides more 
incentive to shirk. Accordingly, a long-term 
contract is expected to reduce or eliminate 
agent’s incentives to shirk. 
Incentive to shirk and privately held 
information will interact and provide a stronger 
effect on the agent’s shirking effort. It is 
hypothesized that the effect of the interaction 
of the two conditions will have greater impact 
on the manager’s decision to continue an 
unprofitable project than only one of the 
conditions will have. 
From the development above, the first 
hypothesis is as follows: 
H1:  Project managers who experience both (1) 
an incentive to shirk and (2) possess 
privately held information will exhibit a 
greater tendency to continue an 
unprofitable project than will those who 
experience only one or neither of these 
conditions. 
 
Lewellen et al. (1987) examines whether 
executive pay packages can be explained as 
attempts to reduce agency costs resulting from 
management having a shorter decision horizon 
than owners. They show that components of 
the executive pay packages are found to vary 
in the predicted manner, thus supporting the 
argument that these compensation plans are 
designed to overcome agency problems. It is 
hypothesized that proper compensation plans 
will lower the impact on manager’s decision to 
continue an unprofitable project.  
Therefore, the second hypothesis is as 
follows: 
                                                 
3
 Shirking is when an agent fails to take actions which are 
in the best interest for the principals or deliberately 
withholding efforts 
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H2:  Compensation (reward and punishment) is 
effective in reducing the escalation effort. 
The first hypothesis predicts that an 
interaction of the incentive to shirk and 
information asymmetry causes project 
managers who experience both conditions to 
make decisions which are not in the best 
interest of the firm. Those who experience only 
one of the conditions or experience neither of 
these conditions are expected to make the same 
evaluation decisions regarding the termination 
of the unprofitable project. 
The second hypothesis predicts that 
introducing an appropriate compensation 
scheme reduces the tendency to make 
decisions in the self-interest of the managers 
which are not in the best interest of the firm. 
METHOD 
Participant 
This experiment uses 220 individuals from 
graduate students of Gadjah Mada University. 
From the 220 individuals, only 166 responses 
are used because 54 responses are invalid. 
These 54 responses are identified through the 
question that is set to filter the validity of 
responses. These participants are chosen 
because they have more work experience 
compared to regular MM and undergraduate 
students. The participants’ work experience 
will facilitate them in the decision-making 
simulation. The participants should possess the 
work experience for the experiment. They are 
assigned to four different groups randomly. 
Each group has a different combination 
treatment of control variables of incentives to 
shirk and privately held information. From the 
demographic information, there are 28 fresh 
graduate students. Since experience is one 
critical factor in making decision in this 
experiment, these 28 fresh-graduate 
(inexperience) students should be excluded 
from the sample. Therefore, after taking out 
the inexperience students, 138 responses are 
finally used to make the conclusion. 
Decision Setting 
In this study, the participants are projected 
into the role of a project manager in charge of 
developing a new product. The project 
manager and his/her team are responsible to 
the R&D division manager. The project was 
originally sponsored by the project manager in 
the beginning of the first year of the project 
and was expected to be completed in two 
years.
4
  
The company (manufacturing division and 
sales division) will be able to produce and sell 
the product after the project is completed. The 
product is independent of the firm’s other 
products. Its success of failure will have no 
impact on the sale of the company's other 
products. The new product was predicted to 
give the company positive net cash flows over 
a very short product life cycle (one year). With 
probability of success predicted to be 75%,
5
 
the expected net cash flows from the new 
product was Rp155 million. The total cost 
allocated to the project was Rp100million from 
which Rp20 million was allocated in the first 
year. 
At the end of the first year, new 
information about the probability of success 
arrived. The new information revised the 
distribution of probability of success into 25%. 
Then, the expected net cash flows will be Rp65 
million. Since the project’s expected net cash 
flows are less than the cost of the project for 
the second year,
6
 the rational decision is to 
terminate the project. 
                                                 
4  The new product process comprises the set or activities 
that move the product from idea to launch [see Dwyer 
and Mellor (1991)]. This process can take from several 
months to several years. To simplify the setting, the 
project takes two years. 
5
  The 75% probability of success is too high and 
unrealistic; however, this high probability is needed for 
the purpose of contrasting with the revised probability 
later. 
6
  The Rp20 million first year expenses were sunk cost and 
were not relevant for the decision making purpose. 
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Figure 1 
 
Event A:  The project manager initiates the project at the beginning of year 1. 
Event B:  New information about the revised distribution of the probability arrives at the end of year 1. 
Event C:  Project manager has to make a decision to continue or to terminate t he project after new 
information arrives. 
Event D:  If the manager continues the project at the beginning of year 1, the project will be completed at 
the end of year 2. 
Event E: Other divisions will start producing and selling the product after the project  is completed. 
Event F:  Other divisions will stop producing and selling the product at the end of year 3.  
 
The participants are asked to evaluate the 
project at the end of the first year using a 4-
point response scale. Harrell and Harrison 
(1993, 1994) use a 10-point response scale. 
The use of a 4-point scale is to force the 
participants to make a more focused decision 
between termination and continuation rather 
than the participants make an arbitrary decision 
between the two extreme ends. The 4-point 
response scale is labeled definitely continue, 
probably continue, probably terminate, and 
definitely terminate.  
The participants are also asked whether 
their response would be different if reward and 
punishment are related to the success of the 
project, such that the project manager will get 
a reward if the project turns out to be profitable 
and will get a punishment if the project turns 
out to be unprofitable. The project is said to be 
profitable if the new product can actually 
contribute positive net cash flows exceeding 
the cost of the project. The participants are 
asked to revise their response after the 
compensation is introduced. 
To provide valid response, the participants 
are asked validation check question. The 
validation check question asks how much the 
company loss would be if the project is 
terminated at the end of the first year. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This experimental study uses a 2x2 
experimental design. Table 1 shows the 
research design used in this experiment. The 
two variables manipulated are: (1) incentives 
to shirk, and (2) privately held information. 
Table 1 . (2 x 2 experimental design) 
 Privately held information 
No Yes 
Incentives 
to shirk 
No Group One Group Two 
Yes Group Three Group Four 
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The participants are randomly assigned to 
one of the four groups. Four types of 
questionnaires are assigned to participants in 
four groups (type A for group One, type B for 
group Two, type C for group Three, and type 
D for group Four). Participants in group One 
and group Three are given information that the 
new information about the revised probability 
of success is known to the project manager and 
his/her team and to other parties as well 
(including the R&D manager). This 
information is expected to eliminate the 
information asymmetry.  
Participants in group Two and Four are 
informed that the new information about the 
revised probability of the success is only 
known to the project manager and his/her 
team. This information is expected to create an 
information asymmetry between the project 
manager and the R&D manager (and the 
company). 
The participants in group One and Two are 
told that the project manager is hired on a 
long-term contract and the result of the project 
will not affect the contract. This information is 
expected to eliminate the incentive to shirk. 
The participants in group Three and Four are 
told that the project manager is hired just for 
this project and the company will or will not 
rehire the manager and being associated with a 
project termination will hurt the manager’s 
reputation in the labor market. This 
information is expected to create an incentive 
to shirk. 
In this experiment, the decisions of the 
participants in Group One, Group Two, Group 
Three, and Group Four are compared. The 
Group Four participants are expected to exhibit 
a greater tendency to continue the project than 
will the other three groups. The decision made 
by the participants of Group One, Group Two, 
and Group Three are not expected to differ 
significantly. Analysis of variance is used to 
examine this issue. 
The participants are also asked to provide 
background information about age, work 
experience, sex, undergraduate background, 
and marital status. This information is used to 
provide additional information about factors 
that could increase the tendency to shirk. 
Data 
Out of the 138 responses, 36 (26%) are 
from type A questionnaire (Group One), 39 
(28%) responses are from type B questionnaire 
(Group Two), 31 (23%) responses are from 
type C questionnaire (Group Three), and 32 
(23%) responses are from type D questionnaire 
(Group Four).  Overall, 47 % of the 
respondents are less than 30 years old, 41% of 
the respondents are between 30 to 40 years old, 
and only 12% of the respondents are above 40 
years old.  
Regarding the experiences, 46% have just 
started working (less than 5 years), 25% have 
worked from 5 to 10 years, and 29% have 
worked longer than 10 years. Seventy-seven 
percents (77%) of the respondents are males. 
Forty-nine percents (49%) of the respondents 
have background in the undergraduate in 
business (management, accounting, or 
economics). Fifty percents (50%) of the 
respondents are married. The complete data are 
shown in table 2. 
Before compensation is introduced (see 
table 3), in Group One, 10 (28%) of the 
respondents are willing to definitely terminate 
the project, while 14 (39%) of respondents 
choose probably terminate, 10 (28%) of 
respondents choose probably continue, and 
only 2 (7%) choose to definitely continue. 
 In Group Two, 10 (26%) of the 
respondents are willing to definitely terminate 
the project, while 15 (38%) of respondents 
choose probably terminate, 9 (23%) of 
respondents choose probably continue, and 
only 5 (13%) choose to definitely continue. 
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Table 2. Data of Respondents  
Ages Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
< 30 years
 
17 19 17 11 64 
30-40 years
 
14 18 10 15 57 
40-50 years
 
5 2 4 6 17 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
      
Experience
 
Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
< 5 years
 
16 18 18 11 63 
5-10 years
 
10 12 5 8 35 
> 10 years
 
10 9 8 13 40 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
      
Sex
 
Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
Male
 
26 31 23 27 107 
Female
 
10 8 8 5 31 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
      
Background
 
Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
Business
 
19 21 15 13 68 
Others
 
17 18 16 19 70 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
      
Marital Status
 
Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
Married
 
18 17 14 20 69 
Single
 
18 22 17 12 69 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
Table 3. Data of Decisions (without compensation) 
Decision Group One Group Two Group Three Group Four Total 
Definitely Terminate 
Probably Terminate 
Probably Continue 
Definitely Continue 
10 
14 
10 
2 
10 
15 
9 
5 
10 
10 
6 
5 
8 
9 
1 
5 
38 
48 
35 
17 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
 
In Group Three, 10 (32%) of the respon-
dents are willing to definitely terminate the 
project, while 10 (32%) of respondents choose 
probably terminate, 6 (19%) of respondents 
choose probably continue, and only 5 (17%) 
choose to definitely continue. 
In Group Four, 8 (25%) of the respondents 
are willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 9 (28%) of respondents choose probably 
terminate, 31 (22%) of respondents choose 
probably continue, and only 5 (16%) choose to 
definitely continue. 
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When compensation is induced (see table 
4), the responses in each type are as follows. In 
Group One, 11 (30%) of the respondents are 
willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 6 (17%) of respondents choose probably 
terminate, 15 (42%) of respondents choose 
probably continue, and only 4 (11%) choose to 
definitely continue. 
In Group Two, 11 (28%) of the respondents 
are willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 10 (26%) of respondents choose 
probably terminate, 10 (26%) of respondents 
choose probably continue, and 8 (20%) choose 
to definitely continue. 
In Group Three, 4 (13%) of the respondents 
are willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 9 (29%) of respondents choose probably 
terminate, 12 (39%) of respondents choose 
probably continue, and only 6 (19%) choose to 
definitely continue. 
 In Group Two, 11 (28%) of the 
respondents are willing to definitely terminate 
the project, while 10 (26%) of respondents 
choose probably terminate, 10 (26%) of 
respondents choose probably continue, and 8 
(20%) choose to definitely continue. 
In Group Three, 4 (13%) of the respondents 
are willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 9 (29%) of respondents choose probably 
terminate, 12 (39%) of respondents choose 
probably continue, and only 6 (19%) choose to 
definitely continue. 
In Group Four, 6 (19%) of the respondents 
are willing to definitely terminate the project, 
while 9 (28%) of respondents choose probably 
terminate, 10 (31%) of respondents choose 
probably continue, and only 7 (22%) choose to 
definitely continue. 
 
Table 4. Data of Decisions (with compensation) 
Decision Group One
 
Group Two
 
Group Three
 
Group Four
 
Total
 
Definitely Terminate 11 11 4 6 32 
Probably Terminate
 
6 10 9 9 34 
Probably Continue
 
15 10 12 10 47 
Definitely Continue
 
4 8 6 7 25 
Total 36 39 31 32 138 
 
Analysis and Results  
The first hypothesis states that managers 
who experience both information asymmetry 
and incentives to shirk will exhibit a greater 
tendency to continue an unprofitable project 
compared to other managers who experience 
only one or neither of these conditions. To 
provide the insight of the results, table 5 shows 
the mean and standard deviation of decision 
(before compensation is induced).  
 
Table 5. Mean and Standard Deviation (in 
parenthesis) of Decision without 
Compensation 
 Privately held information 
No Yes 
Incentives 
to shirk 
No 
Group One 
2.11 
(.89) 
Group Two 
2.23  
(.99) 
Yes 
Group Three 
2.19 
(1.08) 
Group Four 
2.39 
(1.04) 
Notes: p-value of differences among groups is 
>.05 (insignificant) 
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From table 5, it is shown that mean of 
decision in group D (mean of 2.39) are the 
highest (showing a higher tendency to continue 
the project) among the four groups. As 
expected, Group A shows the lowest mean 
(2.11) indicating that a low tendency to 
continue the project. The mean of Group B and 
C are between the mean of Group A and Group 
D. To test the hypothesis, the ANOVA is used 
in this study. The statistics test shows that even 
though Group four shows higher tendency of 
continuing the project, it is not statistically 
significant. To provide more in-depth analysis, 
multiple regressions is used to test the effects 
of information asymmetry, incentives  to shirk, 
ages, and sex on the continuing/terminating 
decision. The result of the regression model is 
shown in table 6. 
The interaction between information 
asymmetry and incentives to shirk is not 
statistically significant. Therefore, the result 
cannot reject the first null hypothesis. 
However, the ages become one factor that 
influences the decision to terminate the 
unprofitable project.  
Table 7 shows the comparisons of 
decisions classified by ages. 
 
 
Table 6. Effects of information asymmetry, incentives  to shirk, ages, and sex on the decision. 
 
 Coefficient Standard Error t value Sig. 
Intercept 2.60 .290 8.96 .000 
Ages -.25 .125 -2.00 .047 
Sex -.01 .204 -.49 .627 
Information Asymmetry .10 .229 .44 .659 
Incentive to Shirk .06 .242 .26 .795 
Interaction of Information Asymmetry and 
Incentive to Shirk  
.16 .340 .46 .647 
 
Table 7. 
Comparisons of Decisions by Ages
2.34 2.61
64 64
.93 1.03
2.23 2.42
57 57
1.02 1.02
1.76 2.12
17 17
1.03 1.11
2.22 2.47
138 138
.99 1.04
Mean
N
Std. Dev iation
Mean
N
Std. Dev iation
Mean
N
Std. Dev iation
Mean
N
Std. Dev iation
AGE
< 30 years old
30-40 years
old
>40 years old
Total
without compensation with compensation
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The results show that older participants 
tend to terminate the unprofitable project while 
the younger participants tend to continue the 
project. When the differences in the mean 
among the three group are tested using the 
ANOVA, it is significant at the 5% (consistent 
with the result in table 7).  
Hypothesis 2 states that compensation is 
effective in reducing the escalation effort. It is 
expected that when compensation is induced, 
the participants tend to alter their decisions so 
that their tendency to continue the unprofitable 
project is low. Table 8 shows that the mean of 
decision overall increases after the compen-
sation is induced. The increase indicates that 
participants have bigger motivation to continue 
the unprofitable project which is in contrast 
with the theory. Therefore, the result cannot 
reject the second null hypothesis. The 
explanations of these results are as follows. 
When the compensation is introduced, 
participants are not willing to give it up 
without trying harder to prove that they are 
capable to reverse the situation. Therefore, 
more participants are willing to continue the 
project even though they know that it is not 
profitable. The paired-sample t test shows that 
the differences in decisions between without 
and with compensation are statistically 
significant at 0.001 levels.  
 
Table 8. Mean and Standard Deviation (in 
parenthesis) of Decision with 
Compensation 
 
Privately held information 
No Yes 
Incentives 
to shirk 
No 
2.33 
(1.04) 
2.38 
(1.11) 
Yes 
2.65 
(.95) 
2.56 
(1.05) 
Notes: p-value of differences among groups is 
>.05 (insignificant) 
This study also compares the decisions 
using work experiences, sex, undergraduate 
background, and marital status. The results 
show that, consistent with ages, managers who 
have more experience show lower tendency to 
continue the unprofitable projects (see table 9). 
Also, female has a greater tendency to continue 
the unprofitable project (see table 10). Students 
with business undergraduate background 
shows higher tendency to shirk (see table 11). 
Finally, un-married persons show higher 
tendency to continue unprofitable projects (see 
table 12). 
 
Table 9 
Comparisons of Decisions by Work Experiences
2.33 2.60
63 63
.95 1.06
2.23 2.40
35 35
1.06 1.01
2.05 2.33
40 40
.99 1.05
2.22 2.47
138 138
.99 1.04
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
WORK
EXPERIENCES0 - 5 years
5 - 10 y ears
> 10 years
Total
without compensation with compensation
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Table 10 
Comparisons of Decisions by Sex
2.32 2.52
31 31
.65 .81
2.20 2.46
107 107
1.07 1.10
2.22 2.47
138 138
.99 1.04
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
SEX
Female
Male
Total
without compensation with compensation
  
Table 11 
Comparisons of Decisions by Undergraduate Background
2.17 2.46
70 70
1.04 1.10
2.28 2.49
68 68
.94 .98
2.22 2.47
138 138
.99 1.04
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iation
Fields
Non-Business
Business
Total
without compensation with compensation
  
Table 12 
Comparisons of Decisions by Marital Status
2.33 2.62
69 69
.89 1.00
2.12 2.32
69 69
1.08 1.06
2.22 2.47
138 138
.99 1.04
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Mean
N
Std.  Dev iat ion
Marital Status
Un-married
Married
Total
without compensation with compensation
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Summary and Conclusion 
The agency theory suggests that project 
managers who have private information and 
incentives to shirk will take a dysfunctional 
action such as continuing an unprofitable 
project. Harrell and Harrison (1994) have 
examined this issue using one experimental 
setting. They found that projects managers 
who experienced both private information and 
incentives to shirk exhibited a greater tendency 
to continue the unprofitable project than did 
the managers who experienced only incentives 
to shirk or private information or neither. 
This issue should be examined widely in 
different setting/scenario and in different 
samples. This study attempts to examine the 
issue. Whether the results will be the same or 
different in different setting and different 
groups of samples are still an empirical issue. 
This study uses 138 students from the Magister 
Management of Gadjah Mada University 
students at Jakarta. These students are all 
working or have worked before they come to 
school. These criteria are important because 
the experiment requires  students have 
experiences in making decisions. 
The results of the study do not fully support 
the Harrell and Harrison’s conclusion. It is 
found that project managers who experienced 
both private information and incentives to 
shirk exhibits a greater tendency to continue 
the unprofitable project, but it is not 
statistically significant. This result should be 
taken with cautious. First, the samples used are 
not real project managers but students who are 
currently working or have worked before. The 
implications of using this sample result in the 
second and third disadvantages. Secondly, the 
participants may ignore the manipulated 
variables. The distributions of the decision are 
almost identical in all four groups. Thirdly, the 
setting is so simple that participants may have 
to use their own assumptions and 
interpretations. 
The results of the study also find that, 
contrary to the expectation, compensation 
(reward and penalty) increases the participants’ 
tendency to continue the unprofitable projects. 
Several suggestions (Baiman, 1982; Harrell 
and Harrison, 1994) provide a logical 
explanation that the shirking behavior will be 
less when compensation is considered. When 
the compensation is introduced, all managers 
increase their tendency to continue the project. 
They may have thought that if they stop the 
projects they do not get anything. Maybe, the 
compensation should include rewards if they 
terminate unprofitable projects.   
Additionally, the study also find that 
female, younger persons, relatively less 
experience persons, participants having 
business undergraduate background, and un-
married persons have higher tendency to 
continue the unprofitable projects. These 
findings may support the idea that risk is a 
major factor that influences the behavior of 
people.  
Future research should be taken to examine 
the inconsistency of these results with prior 
studies. The more powerful setting should be 
developed in order to gain a better result. Also, 
using real project managers is an advantage. 
Future research should also measure risk 
preference of the participants and incorporate 
risk in the analysis. The interaction of private 
information, incentive to shirk, and riskier 
persons will have a strong effect on decision to 
continuing the unprofitable project. Another 
variable to be considered is locus of control. 
People having internal locus of control may 
tend to continue the unprofitable projects since 
they think that they are capable to alter the 
conditions. 
REFERENCES 
Baiman, S. 1982. Agency Research in 
Managerial Accounting: A Survey. 
Journal of Accounting Literature, 154-
213. 
Baiman, S. 1990. Agency Research in 
Managerial Accounting: A Second Look. 
2004 Sumartono, Herdiana, Moesa & Jatna  
 
13 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
15(4): 341-371. 
Bowen, M. G. 1987. The Escalation 
Phenomenon Reconsidered: Decision 
Dilemmas or Decision Errors? Academy of 
Management Review, 12(1): 52-66. 
Brown, C. E. and I. Solomon. 1993. An 
Experimental Investigation of Explanation 
for Outcome Effects on Appraisals of 
Capital-Budgeting Decisions. Contempo-
rary Accounting Research, 10(1): 83-111. 
Dwyer, L. and Mellor, R. 1991. New Product 
Process Activities and Project Outcomes. 
R&D Management, 21(1): 31-42. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. 1989. Agency Theory: An 
Assessment and Review. Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1): 57-74. 
Harrison, P. and A. Harrell. 1993. Impact of 
Adverse Selection on Manager’s Project 
Evaluation Decisions. Academy of 
Management Review, 36(3): 635-643. 
Harrison, P. and A. Harrell. 1994. An 
Incentive to Shirk, Privately Held 
Information, and Evaluation Decisions. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 
19(7): 569-577. 
Johnson, E., et al. 1998. An Examination of 
Potential Gender-Based Differences in 
Audit Managers’ Performance Evaluation 
Judgments. Behavioral Research in 
Accounting, 10(2): 47-75. 
Kanodia, C., et al. 1989. Escalation Errors and 
the Sunk Cost Effect: An Explanation 
Based on Reputation and Information 
Asymmetries. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 27(1): 59-77. 
Leatherwood, M. and E. Conlon. 1987. 
Diffusibility of Blame: Effects on 
Persistence in a Project. Academy of 
Management Review, 30(4): 836-847. 
Leatherwood, M. and E. Conlon. 1988. The 
Impact of Prospectively Relevant 
Information on Persistence in a Project 
Subsequent Setbacks. Advances in 
Information Processing in Organizations, 
3: 207-219. 
Lewellen, W., et al. 1987. Executive 
Compensation and Executive Incentive 
Problems: An Empirical Analysis. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 287-310. 
March, J. and Z. Shapira. 1987. Managerial 
Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking. 
Management Science, 33(11): 1404-1418. 
Reutlinger, S. 1970. Techniques for Project 
Appraisal Under Uncertainty (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins Press). 
Staw, B. M. 1981. The Escalation of 
Commitment to a Course of Action. 
Academy of Management Review, 6(4): 
577-587.
 
 
 
 
 Jurnal Ekonomi & Bisnis Indonesia Januari 
 
14 
 
 
 
 
Continue or Terminate? 
 
Put yourself in the role of a project manager in charge of developing a new product. You are 
responsible to the R&D division manager. As a project manager, you are in charge of developing a 
new product. The project was originally sponsored by you in the beginning o f the first year of the 
project and was expected to be completed in two years. The expected costs of the project for the 
first year and the second year respectively were Rp20 million and Rp80 million. 
If the project is successful, the company will be able to produce and sell the product. The product 
is independent of the firm’s other products. Its success or failure will have no impact on the sale of 
the company’s other products. Upon the completion of the project, the product will be 
manufactured and sold in the third year. The product’s life cycle is only 1 year. The estimated net 
cash flow for the product in the third year is Rp155 million based on the following calculations: 
 Probability Profit Estimated cash flow (probability x profit) 
Success 70% Rp200 million 70% x Rp200 million = Rp140 million 
Failure 30% Rp50 million 30% x Rp50 million = Rp15 million 
Estimated cash flow at the beginning of project                                   Rp155 million 
At the end of the first year, new information related to the successfulness of the product is 
discovered. Based on the new information, the distribution of probability of success is revised as 
calculated below: 
 Probability Profit Estimated cash flow (probability x profit) 
Success 10% Rp200 million 10% x Rp200 million = Rp20 million 
Failure 90% Rp50 million 90% x Rp50 million = Rp45 million 
Estimated cash flow at the beginning of project                                   Rp65 million 
It is highly probable that your superior (R&D Manager) does not possess this new information. 
The whole condition is illustrated as follows: 
 
Sample of the Questionnaire 
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Description: 
A:  The project is commenced at the beginning of year 1 
B:  New information regarding the product’s probability of success are discovered at the end of 
year 1 
C:  You are required to make the decision to continue or terminate the project 
D:  If you decide to continue, the project will be completed at the end of year 2 
E:  The Company will manufacture and sell the product upon the completion of the project  
     (beginning of year 3) 
F:  The company will stop producing and selling the product at the end of year 3 
 
What you also need to know in relation with your decision is that that you are being hired only for 
this project. The outcome of this project will affect your reputation in obtaining future contracts . 
 
Questions: (please circle your chosen answer) 
1. According to the information above, if the project is terminated at the end of year 1, how 
much loss  has been suffered by the firm? 
A. Rp0    D. Rp100 million 
B. Rp20 million  E. Rp35 million 
C. Rp80 million  F. Profit Rp65 million 
2. Your decision regarding the project: 
A. Definitely terminate   B. Probably terminate   C. Probably continue   D. Definitely 
continue 
3. If your compensation is highly dependant on the outcome of the project (if profitable you will 
receive a bonus and if unprofitable you will receive a penalty), what will your decision be?  
A. Definitely terminate   B. Probably terminate   C. Probably continue   D. Definitely 
continue 
 
Personal information: 
1. Age:   A. <30 years old    B. 30-40 years old    C. >40 years old 
2. How long have you been working?  
A. Not working   C. <10 years 
B. <5 years   D. >10 years 
3. Sex:  A. Male B. Female 
4. Your position within the company: __________________________________  
5. Field of study for S1 degree: _______________________________________ 
6. Marital status: A. Single B. Married 
 
Thank you for your participation 
